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Abstract: The relationships between retailers and producers are considered for understanding the determinants of 
quality, variety and prices. In the food sector, some issues have been extensively studied: impacts of private labels, 
supply contracts, price transmission. Despite an increasing role, the implementation of “Category management” (CM) 
has been less studied. CM belongs to a set of methods based on the concepts of Efficient Consumer Response and 
Supply  Chain  Management  which  have  been  widely  implemented  by  large  retailers  and  thus  have  changed  the 
relationships among actors in the food chain. As a part of this evolution, Category Captain’s concept (CC) involves a 
commitment  between  a  retailer  and  one  of  the  suppliers  who  receives  decision-making  power  over  the  product 
category. Usually, the major of the food suppliers plays the CC’s role in partnership with the retailers. In practices, 
CC raises many questions. What effects on the sales and prices? Is it beneficial for all the stakeholders, including the 
consumers? What are their consequences on the non captain suppliers? We propose a vertical relationship model 
considering that the retailer is the chain’s leader (Stackelberg game). We compare a non-cooperative game (no CC) to 
a  cooperative  game  (one  supplier  as  CC).  We  analyse  under  which  conditions  CC  improves  the  profit  of  each 
stakeholder, as well as the consumers’ surplus. We show that the cooperative game is always a “win, win, win” game 
for  stakeholders  (but  not  necessary  for  consumers)  if  the  two  suppliers  offer  similar  products.  If  products  are 
different, we define the parameters relationships under which CC is beneficial for stakeholders and consumers. 
 




The  relationships  between  retailers  and  producers  are  important  to  consider  for  understanding  the 
determinants of quality, variety and prices. In the food sector, some issues have been extensively studied: 
impacts of private labels on the retailer/supplier competition; effects of various supply contracts on the 
profit sharing between stakeholders in chains; price transmission from upstream to downstream levels... 
Despite  an  increasing  role  in  the  producer-retailer  relationships,  the  implementation  of  “Category 
management” (CM) has been less studied. “CM” belongs to a set of methods based on the concepts of 
Efficient Consumer Response and Supply Chain Management which have been widely implemented by 
large retailers and thus have changed the relationships among actors in the food chain. Linked tools bring 
improvements in supplier-retailer relationship, such as inventory drops, customer welfare increase, costs 
decrease...  
 
As a part of this evolution, supermarkets have successfully engendered a competition among suppliers for 
"Category Captaincies". Category Captain’s concept involves a commitment between a retailer and one of 
the suppliers who receives decision-making power over the product category. Usually, the major of the 
food  suppliers  plays  the  role  of  'Category  Captain'  (CC)  in  partnership  with  the  retailers,  further 
weakening the position of secondary brand suppliers (Duffy & Fearne, 2007). The CC, in collaboration 
with the retailer, decides the share of the shelf-space allocated to the various products within the category, 
the prices and promotional actions, and where each brand must be located on the shelves. Such a method 
is  based  on  the  assumption  that  the  suppliers  have  a  better  knowledge  than  the  retailers  about  the 
consumers’ preferences and are able to better organize the shelf-space in order to maximize the sales 
(Steiner, 2001).    3
 
CM  practices  raise  many  questions.  What  effects  do  they  have  on  the  sales  and  prices?  Are  they 
beneficial for all the stakeholders, including the consumers? Particularly, what are their consequences on 
the  non  captain  suppliers?  Some  recent  papers  have  proposed  interesting  models  to  answer  these 
questions. For instance, some papers determine the optimal shelf space allocation (Bai & Kendall, 2008) 
and optimal prices (Rosenthal, 2008). Other ones propose a game-theoretic approach in a supplier and 
retailer brands’ competing (Martin et al, 2005; Amrouche & Zaccour, 2009). However, in many of these 
papers, the analysis is based on the assumption that’s the suppliers have the bargaining power in the 
chain. 
  
As  such  an  assumption  is  not  always  true  in  the  food  sector,  we  propose  an  analytical  framework 
considering that the retailer is the chain’s leader.  In the first section of the paper, we describe some 
examples of CM methods implemented in the food sector. In the second section, we propose a vertical 
relationship model in which a retailer and two suppliers are involved. Each of the two suppliers offers a 
national brand product of the same category, but one of them plays the CC role. Considering that the 
retailer is the leader (Stackelberg game), we compare a non-cooperative game (no category captain) to a 
cooperative game (one supplier is a category captain). 
  
In scenario 1, the retailer seeks to allocate her shelf space and to determine her prices so as to maximize 
her profit. The suppliers then react by choosing their developed unit wholesale prices. In scenario 2, a 
cooperative game is between one supplier and the retailer. They seek conjointly to allocate the shelf space 
and to determine the prices so as to maximize their joint profit. A Nash negotiation allows determining 
the wholesale price of the category captain. The non captain supplier reacts by determining her wholesale 
price.  We  then  analyse  under  which  conditions  the  cooperative  game  improves  the  profit  of  each 
stakeholder, as well as the consumers’ surplus. We show that the cooperative game is always a “win, win, 
win” game for the suppliers and the retailer (but not necessary for consumers) if the two suppliers offer 
similar products (that is with the same crossed price elasticity). If products are different, we define the 
parameters  relationships  under  which  the  category  captain  improves  suppliers-retailer  profits  and 
consumers’ surplus. 
 
The economic environment in which retailers and suppliers operate has changed considerably in recent 
years. In consideration on innovation and change, food firms must respond to numerous disruptions, both 
internal and / or external. The increase of references, severe fluctuations in demand and the power of 
large retailers (in terms of packaging, delivery schedules, deadlines consumption ,...) impose on industry 
to  question  their  relationships  with  suppliers  and  retailers,  and  consequently  their  logistical  and 
organizational principles of production. Moreover, food chains are highly subject to the requirements of 
quality, safety and health. 
 
The  complexity  of  relationships  with  large  retailers  is  reinforced  by  the  specific  nature  of  the  food 
industry in the management of logistics flows (Treillon & Lecomte, 1996). Since the initial development 
of hypermarkets and supermarkets, difficulties in the supplier-retailer relationship has been established. In 
the 70's, new power relations have moved from producers to distributors, who wanted to keep low prices, 
encouraging volumes versus margins. During the 80's, the development of private labels has imposed new 
conditions in the relations. Starting 90's, the retailers concentration (mergers) has accelerated. Today in 
France, six distributors share about 80% of the food market, with an increase of hard discount channels. 
In this new competitive environment, industrial policy could not only focus on lower costs but also on 
value-added rise. Food industry and distributors have thus become aware of the need to closely coordinate 
their activities to improve the consumer satisfaction. The realization of this collaboration then expressed 
through  new  concepts  such  as  the  ECR  (Efficient  Consumer  Response)  and  SCM  (Supply  Chain 
Management). These concepts have lead to a large number of organisational structures and operational 
tools. The category management concept appears as the management of a set of distinct products that 
consumers  consider  complementary  or  substitutable  in  order  to  meet  their  needs  (Steiner,  2001).  In 
addition to the CM concept, Category Captain has emerged as the supplier who will be responsible for 
managing distributor shelves. He proposes new shelves allocation, selling prices, promotional plans. 
 
The  paper  deals  with  this  category  captain  concept  and  its  effects  on  inventory  policy  and  prices 
definition. With a mathematical approach, we compare two scenarii of prices and shelf space allocations 
with and without a category captain.   4
   5
2. The model 
 
Consider first all parameters and variables: 
di  demand function for product i 
pi  retailer’s price of product i 
wi  supplier’s price of product i 
ci  supplier’s production cost of product i 
a  constant scale of market 
bi  price elasticity of product i 
q  crossed price elasticity 
e  shelf space elasticity 
s  shelf space share 
 
We consider a classical model involving a retailer R and two suppliers Si (i=1, 2) that offer a national 
brand product of the same category. We assume that the total capacity of the shelf space equals 1. Then, s 
denotes the share of shelf-space dedicated to product 1, and then (1-s) the share dedicated of product 2.  
 
Following Amrouche and Zaccour (2007), we assume that the demand of each product increases with the 
shelf space. Then, demands take the following form: 
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To illustrate our purpose, we compare one non-cooperative game (no category captain) to a cooperative 
game (S1 is the category captain).  
 
In scenario 1, the game is played with the retailer as leader and the suppliers as follower. The retailer 
seeks to determine prices pi to maximize her profit with a given shelf space s (exogenous). The suppliers 
then react by choosing there unit wholesale prices wi. In that case, wholesale prices wi are exogenous. 
 
In scenario 2, a cooperative game is developed between the supplier S1 (category captain) and the retailer. 
They seek conjointly to determine prices pi and shelf space s to maximize their joint profit. A Nash 
negotiation allows determining the wholesale price w1. Supplier 2 (follower) then reacts by defining her 
wholesale price w2. To take into account a negotiation power of S2, the shelf space share is computed 
such that her profit evolution is a (a > 0). 
 
To complete our notation, we add an index “ni” (situation 1) or “i” (situation 2) to each parameter that 
can change between the two models. The two procedures are then defined as follows: 
 
Scenario 1  Non-cooperative game (no captain) 
 
  Exogenous parameters: w1ni, w2ni, a, e, b1, b2, q, sni 
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Scenario2  Cooperative game (S1 is captain) 
   
  Exogenous parameters: w1ni, w2ni, a, e, b1, b2, q , sni 
  R and S1 optimizes their joint profit  ) (
1
2 1, S R
p p
Max P + P  
  The wholesale price w1 is determinated by a Nash negotiation: 
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All optimizations verify the classical first and second order conditions. 
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3. Analysis of results 
 
In this part,  we analyse the  conditions  which allows the cooperation (that is the profit of R and S1 
increase) with  9 . 0 ; 1 ; 01 . 0 ; 5 . 0 ; 5 . 0 ; 10 2 1 = = = = = = a q e b b a . 
 
Initial shelf space threshold 
 



















If we compare the profits obtained by retailer R and Supplier S1 before and after the implementation of 
the Category Captain organization, it appears that the retailer and the CC refuse the cooperation if the 
shelf space of S1 is too low in the initial situation. This threshold decreases with a (that is the negotiation 
power of the competitor S2 decreases).   8
Price elasticity threshold 
 
With sni = 0.5, we obtain a maximal value b1 that allows cooperation (P1i > P1ni) 
0,4 0,5 0,6 0,7 0,8
P1ni P1i
0,4 0,5 0,6 0,7 0,8
PRni PRi SCMni SCMi
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Once again, the behaviors of the retailer and the category captain depend on the price elasticity level of 
the products. Nevertheless, the total market (q1+q2) increases with the CC organization. 
 
4. Concluding remarks 
 
The category Captain organization is becoming a current practice in supply chain management which 
modifies the relationships between producers and retailers. In this paper, we proposed a first version of a 
model designed to assess the impacts of such an organization. Despite some limitations we will have to 
reduce in a future work, it allows to identify some conditions under which one supplier decides or not to 
accept the role of category captain. If we impose some condition on the competitor (with a), it appears 
that some parameter condition will influence the cooperation decisions of the retailer and the supplier 
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